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A BSTR  ACT  
The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 includes the government’s reform 
of the banking industry regarding ‘ring-fencing’ and the ‘electrification’ of the ring- 
fence. The ring-fencing provisions in the Act are based on Sir John Vickers’ Report 
and the recommendations from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
(PCBS). The PCBS argument was that the envisaged ‘ring-fence’ regulation in the 
Bill, based on Sir John Vickers’ report, fell short of expectations, and would be easily 
breached by unscrupulous bankers; therefore it recommended that to strengthen it fur- 
ther, the ring-fence should be fortified with more punitive regulatory measures, dubbed 
as ‘electrifying the ring-fence’. This ‘electrification’ seems to be an innovative idea to 
solve the problems envisaged; however, it is argued that this idea is not without theo- 
retical problems of its own. Also, it is suggested that to solve behavioural and structural 
problems within banking institutions, the Act could have benefited from a regulatory 
regime based on the concept of ‘whistle-blowers’ and economic incentives, also found 
in section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and the Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act). 
 
PA RT 1 
 
1. . IN TRODUCTION   
The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (Banking Reforms Act) (the Act) 
received Royal Assent on 18 December 2013. The Act implements the final recom- 
mendations of the Independent Commission on Banking (the Commission), set up 
by the government in 2010 to consider structural reform of the banking sector.1 The 
Act, among others,2 primarily focuses on the sector’s structural problems, and hence 
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1 Final Report, Recommendations, Independent Commission on Banking, September 2011, http://bankingcommission. 
independent.gov.uk/ 
2 The large UK banking groups are required to hold equity and other regulatory capital to absorb losses. Also, four key areas 
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recommends structural regulation and a command and control strategy3 in the form 
of ‘ring-fencing’—the concept of a firewall between retail, deposit-taking banking, and 
riskier investment banking. This means that retail banking should be separated from 
wholesale or investment banking within a banking group.4 The Act focuses on the prin- 
ciple that it should be easier and less costly to bring about the resolution of a bank when 
it gets into financial difficulties. This simply means determining which activities of a 
failing bank must be allowed to continue in an orderly manner. This regulatory strategy 
is meant to ensure the continuous provision of a vital service to the economy and the 
customers of a bank.5 The implicit policy objective is to curtail moral hazard6 as well as 
the idea that the banks could rely on the implicit guarantees of the government as they 
are seen to be ‘too big to fail’,7 and that the government stands as a lender of last resort8 
for the failing banks. 
At the Bill9 stage, the process was joined by the recommendations from the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS),10 dubbed as ‘electrification’ 
of the ring-fence, meaning a further strengthening of the ring-fence mechanism. The 
PCBS published its report on the draft Bank Reform Bill on 11 March 2013,11 whereby 
it challenged the government’s reform of the banking industry. The PCBS was of the 
opinion that the government’s reform of the banking industry fell short of what was 
required.12 The PCBS identified a number of challenges that a new structural framework 
(ring-fence) for banks would face.13 In view of these challenges, the PCBS believed that 
the ring-fencing proposals as they stood in the Bill might ‘not be sufficient to achieve 
the government’s policy objectives.14 The PCBS recommended ‘a series of measures to 
3 B Morgan and K Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (CUP 2007), 80–85; R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding 
Regulation (2nd edn OUP 2012), 106–107; R Baldwin, ‘Regulation: After Command and Control’, in K Hawkins (ed.), The 
Human Face of Law (OUP 1997); T Daintith, ‘The Techniques of Government’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds.), The Changing 
Constitution (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 209–236; C Veljanovski, ‘Economic Approaches to Regulation’, in R Baldwin, 
M Cave and M Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010), 27–28 and 33–34; see also C Coglianese and E 
Mendelson, ‘Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation’, in R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of Regulation 
(OUP 2010), 146–151. 
4 See M Blair, G Waker and R Purves, Financial Services Law (OUP 2014), 648–652. 
5 The Government response to the ICB recommendations was published on 19 December 2011; see Cm 8252 Government 
response to the Independent Commission on Banking. Further developed Government proposals were set in the White Paper, 
Cm 8356 Banking reforms: delivering stability and supporting a sustainable economy. 
6 R Baldwin and M Cave, (n 1) 20; IG MacNeil, An Introduction to The Law on Financial Investment (Hart 2012), 31–32; see 
generally, G Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven 1970). 
7 See generally, E Greene et al., ‘A Closer Look at ‘ Too big to Fail’: National and International Approaches to Addressing 
the Risk of Large, International Financial Institutions’Capital Markets Law Journal 2(5), 117; AR Sorkin, Too Big to Fail, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin 2010). 
8 TM Humphrey and RE Kelcher, ‘The Lender of Last Resort: A Historical Perspective’ Cato Journal 4, 275; X Freixas, C 
Giannini, G Hoggarth and F Soussa, ‘Lender of Last Resort - A Review of the Literature’, in C Goodhart and G Illing (eds), 
Financial Crisis, Contagion, and the Lender of the Last Resort (OUP 2002); A Campbell and R Lastra, ‘Revisiting the Lender 
of Last Resort-The Role of the Bank of England’, in I MacNeil and O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation, 2010, 
161–178. 
9 The Bill was published on 10 October 2012 in Cm 8453 Sound Banking: Delivering Reform. This was to enable pre-legislative 
scrutiny of the Bill by the PCBS. 
10 See PCBS First report (HL98-HC848), Second report (HL 126-HC 1012) and the Final report, Changing Banking for 
Good (HL 27-1-HC 175-1). 
11 HL Paper 126 HC 1012. 
12 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards’ Final Report (n 11). 
13 First Report, paras 63–78, (n 11), and HL Paper 98 of session 1012. 
14 First Report, para 94 (n 11). 
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reinforce the ring-fence in order to increase the prospect of it proving durable in the 
long-run’15 and ‘…to create a significant new disincentive for banks seeking over time 
to test the ring-fence with a view to undermining its effectiveness’.16 
In this context, the PCBS made two distinct recommendations to be included in 
the Bill in terms of ‘first and second reserve powers’ (electrification provision). These 
two reserve powers, punitive in nature, were meant to deter bankers from unscrupu- 
lously breaching the ring-fence. These recommendations were the specific proposals 
for ‘electrification’ of the ring-fence of banks, implying that banks need to be incen- 
tivized to respect the integrity of the ring-fence.17 The first recommendation18 (first 
reserve power) is included in the Act19; however, the second20 recommendation (sec- 
ond power), which was to exercise full separation across the banking sector as a whole, 
meaning to enforce a complete structural separation across the sector, was ignored by 
parliament.21 Thus, the Act includes government’s reform of the banking industry in 
respect of ‘ring-fencing’ and ‘electrification’ of ring-fencing, with a watered-down ver- 
sion of electrification. 
The Banking Reforms Act is a unique milestone in the history of banking regula- 
tion in the United Kingdom. The prior banking regulation in the United Kingdom, 
since the hay days of self-regulation,22 unlike the US regulatory culture,23 was largely 
 
15 See Second Report, para 5; also First Report, para 126. The Commission’s report was supported by Sir John Vickers as to 
increasing the durability and permanence of the ring-fence (quoted in Second Report, para 5). 
16 See Second Report, para 8. 
17 A Tyrie MP said that ‘[F]or the ring-fence to succeed, banks need to be discouraged from gaming the rules. All history tells 
us they will do this unless incentivised not to’, 21 December 2012, The Telegraph. 
18 Second Report, para 10: The first power would ‘enable the regulator to take steps that could lead to a specific banking group 
affected by the ring-fence being required to divest itself fully of either its ring-fenced or its non-ring-fenced bank. This power 
could thus be exercised in respect of an individual bank (or more than one if necessary) while retaining the benefits across 
the sector as a whole of diversification…’ 
Second Report, para 11: An individual banking group could be obliged to full separation of retail and wholesale activities. See, 
how the first reserve power might work, and also several safeguards: ‘ a) A stipulation that the regulator could only commence the 
process if it felt there was a significant risk to the objectives of the ring-fence; b) A provision that the power would not be exercis- 
able before the first independent review of the effectiveness of the ring-fence (an independent review which we discuss in the next 
section of this Report); c) A requirement for the regulator to give a banking group early notice of any intention to use the reserve 
power; d) The appointment of an external reviewer to consider the relationship between the banking group concerned and the 
regulator; e) A right of appeal in relation to the exercise of the power; and f) A Treasury power to override implementation.’ 
19 See FSMA 2000, section 142. 
20 Second Report, para 25: ‘Alongside our proposal for a group-specific regulatory power to enforce full structural separation, 
we recommended that the independent review should be required to assess the case for a move to full separation across the 
banking sector as a whole’. See also First Report, paras 164, 171. 
21 Second Report, paras 25–28. The government rejected the case for a ‘second reserve power on various grounds: ‘First, it con- 
tends that passing such legislation would entail the Government pursuing a ‘different policy’ from that contained in the Bill, a 
policy which in the Government’s view would be based on the assumption that the ring-fence might fail, when the Government 
does not itself believe that the ring-fence will fail. Second, the Government argues that ‘it is not necessary to legislate now for 
a reserve power to abandon ring-fencing at some point in the future’, because this is a decision best made by Government and 
Parliament at the time. Third, it contends that it would be wrong for the final decision on whether to bring in such a radical 
change to be in the hands of the regulator rather than for Government and Parliament.’ (Second Report, para 26). 
22 Before 1979, with some exceptions, a deposit-taking institution in the United Kingdom did not require any licence or author- 
ization: see Lord Steyn eloquently elaborates this fact in his judgment in Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor 
and Company of the Bank of England (HL) 18 May 2000, 2000 WL 571203; C Hadjiemmanuil, ‘The Bank of England and the 
Lessons from Barings: UK Banking Regulation under Parliamentary Scrutiny’, 1 Y.B. Int’l Fin. & Econ. L. 1996, 333. 
23 The idea of separation of commercial and invest banking first appeared in National Bank Act of 1866 and it was reintroduced 






































































































non-structural in nature and did not require the separation of commercial and invest- 
ment banking; the experiment of such structural regulation in the United States can be 
traced back to National Bank Act of 1866. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA) and the regulatory response24 to the 2007–08 financial crisis in the form of 
the Banking Act 2009 were believed to be insufficient for the regulatory requirements 
of the present times. The Banking Reforms Act, in this sense, ushers in the new era of 
financial regulation and makes a clear-cut watershed in the development of banking 
regulation in the United Kingdom. 
However, this article highlights the theoretical shortcomings of the idea of electrifi- 
cation of the ring-fence and questions its necessity as a corrective regulatory tool. Also, 
it is argued that the emphasis on structural regulation in the context of electrification 
leaves out some of the important behavioural issues. Behavioural regulation25 is equally 
important as compared to structural regulation, as is manifested across the developed 
world.26 In this context, the article advocates the usefulness of the concept of ‘whistle- 
blowers’ as an alternative regulatory tool to the costly and disruptive solution of ‘elec- 
trification of ring-fence’. 
Part 1 deals with the definitional issues of ring-fencing as well as the justification, 
theoretical basis and strategy of regulation in the context of ring-fencing regulation as 
found in the Act. Part 2 deals with the idea of ‘electrification’. Part 3 deals with the idea 
of ‘a whistle-blower’. Finally, the article concludes that the idea of ‘electrification’ has 
its own theoretical shortcomings and that the Act should have included the idea of 
‘whistle-blower’ provisions, incentivizing employees as a major strategy of regulation. 
 
2. . R ING - FENCING A ND THE ‘ ELECTR IFIC ATION’  OF  
THE R ING - FENCE  
A. Defining the Ring-Fence 
Ring-fencing is a relatively old concept, which has been used as a trouble-shooter or 
panacea to solve problems in a number of sectors. It has been used as a regulatory solu- 
tion in banking and many other utility sectors; however, since the 2007 financial cri- 
sis, it has been a buzzword for financial regulatory reform across many jurisdictions. 
Perhaps this is the only idea available that has been well tested and immortalized in a 
number of past regulatory reforms. In the context of financial regulation, the idea first 
came to light as a concept in the United States in the National Bank Act of 1866; it 
introduced an idea of partial separation of the banking sector. Then, in the aftermath 
of the Great Depression, the concept of the ring-fence gained further impetus and was 
introduced in the legislative form in the Glass-Steagal Act; this introduced the idea of 
complete structural separation of investment and commercial banking. In the aftermath 
of the 2007–08 financial crises, finally, yet again, ring-fencing took centre stage in the 
Dodd-Frank Act 2010. So, the nature of regulation in this context has long been settled 
in favour of partial or complete separation. The concept of ring-fencing may not sound 
 
24 CAE Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis’, Edward Elgar, 2009. 
25 E Avgouleas, ‘What Future for Disclosure as a Regulatory Technique? Lessons from Behavioural Decision Theory and the 
Global Financial Crisis’ in MacNeil and O’Brien (eds) (n 9), 205–225. 
26 For example, whistle-blower regulation in Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and SOX. See 
below Part 2. 
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an innovative idea; however, its functional application may refute that argument. For 
example, the place and height of the ring-fence in the Banking Reform Act itself, as 
discussed below, is innovative. 
Ring-fencing is a financial regulatory concept when used for financial institutions, 
including banks. In conceptual terms, the ring-fencing primarily means reorganizing 
the allocation of risk27 optimally for the purpose of reducing the risk that is associated 
with the activities of a company.28 However, the question is how one can define ring- 
fencing as a financial regulatory concept in a legal sense. It has always been difficult to 
form an abstract definition of a concept which has a number of functional applications, 
let alone in law but in other disciplines as well; therefore the unsurmountable problem 
is ‘the lack of an agreed-upon methodology on how to…define legal concepts.’29 Ring- 
fencing is a functional concept rooted in pragmatism with real economic consequences 
and is incapable of normative definition30; the functional approach avoids unwanted 
interpretations.31 So, the concept of a ring-fence should be defined functionally, taking 
into account all the intended functions of a ring-fence. For example, if the functions 
of the ring-fence are to make a firm’s bankruptcy remote, to help a firm operate on a 
stand-alone basis, to preserve a firm’s business and assets, or to limit a firm’s risky activi- 
ties and investment, then the concept of ring-fencing should be defined accordingly. 
Notwithstanding, in all these cases regulation is used to reallocate the risk optimally for 
the purpose of reducing risk for the companies. 
Because the concept is used in different contexts and scenarios, its definition and 
specific application each time are different. So, each context or scenario produces its 
own ‘functional definition’ by answering a simple question—what is the ‘function’ of a 
particular ring-fencing, and, in other words, what is the function of a particular regula- 
tory reform? What are the objectives that these functions will achieve? So, in a theoreti- 
cal analysis, if the aim of the ring-fence is to achieve stability, the functions or objectives 
of the ring-fence are to achieve that particular aim and the strategies to achieve these 
objectives are the methodologies.32 
Thus, one can argue that ring-fencing is a functional financial regulatory concept 
regarding financial institutions, which entails economic consequences.33 The lack of 
an agreed-upon methodology regarding how to define this legal concept normatively 
causes problems,34 and it can therefore only be defined in view of its functions. Because 
the concept can only be understood due to its foundation in a common practice in the 
context of banking and finance, ideally that is how this should be defined rather than in 
 
27 See generally J Black. ‘The Role of Risk in Regulatory Process’, in R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, (n 1) p 302; ‘The term is 
also used in a regulatory sense to describe a way of managing a corporation where certain parts of the business could be ring 
fenced to ensure that losses in one part did not affect another’, See Financial Times Lexicon. 
28 SL Schwarcz, Ring-fencing , 87 S. Cal. L. Rev, (2013), 5. 
29 L Kahler, ‘The Influence of Normative Reasons on the Formation of Legal Concepts’ in Concepts in Law 81, 90 ( JC Hage 
and D Pfordten eds., 2009); See also, D Patterson, Dworkin on the ‘Semantics of Legal Political Concepts,’ [2006] Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 26, 552, 553 . 
30 SL Schwarcz (n 28) p 14; See also, SL Schwarcz, What is Securitisation? And for What Purpose? [2012] The  Southern 
California Law Review, 1283, 1289. 
31 L Kahler (n 29) 90, ‘[i]f all concerned people understand concepts A, B and C in a specific way due to their foundation in … 
common practice, it is preferable to use them rather than the more abstract concept of D that contains A, B and C.’ 
32 SL Schwarcz (n 28) 5–6, 15. 
33             Ibid. 
 





































































































a normative sense, which would be a mere abstraction and would lack usefulness. Once 
the functions of the ring-fence have been identified and the concept of ring-fencing has 
adequately been defined from its functional perspective, then and only then should the 
regulation be designed and defined accordingly. 
The Banking Reforms Act adopts the functional definition of the concept of ring- 
fencing; it espouses the idea of ring-fencing of certain activities.35 The important issues 
relating to the ring-fence are its location and height in a given context to achieve the 
objectives of the legislation. All household and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SME) deposit-taking and current account provision must take place within the ring-
fenced bank, and the ring-fenced banks are barred from operating a range of 
wholesale and investment banking activities. A num- ber of provisions in the Act 
relate to the ‘location’ of the ring-fence, about defining, and allowing the government 
to define, concepts and activities,36 and also determine which activities must or must 
not be carried out within the ring-fenced banks.37 
The relevant provision in the Act regarding the ‘height’ of the ring-fence requires the 
regulator to make rules for a ring-fenced bank, ensuring that it can work independently of 
the group and that the ring-fenced banks’ core activities are not jeopardized by the acts or 
omissions of other persons; the rules must also cover intra-group exposures, independ- 
ent corporate governance, and payment of dividends.38 The ‘electrification’ regulation is 
 
35 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, Explanatory Notes: ‘section 4: Ring-fencing of certain activities 
26 Section 4(1) inserts new Part 9B (ring-fencing) into FSMA. 
27 New section 142A(1) defines ‘ring-fenced body’ for the purposes of FSMA, as any UK institution which carries on at least 
one core activity for which it has been given a Part 4A permission under FSMA. Subsection (2) excludes building societies 
from the definition of ‘ring-fenced bodies’ and gives the Treasury power to exclude other institutions from the definition by 
order. This power will enable the Treasury to provide that only banks above a certain size will be required to be ‘ring-fenced 
bodies’. Subsection (3) sets out the condition which must be satisfied before the Treasury is able to make such an order: 
the Treasury must be satisfied that excluding the classes of institution in question from the definition of a ring-fenced body 
would not harm the continued provision in the United Kingdom of core services. Subsection (4) requires the Treasury to 
consider the impact the exercise of their powers to exempt certain UK institutions from the definition of ‘ring-fenced body’ 
might have on competition in the provision of core services, and whether any adverse impact might be mitigated. Subsection 
(6) allows the Treasury to set conditions on the grant of an exemption from the definition of a ‘ring-fenced body’, and subsec- 
tion (7) defines ‘UK institution’ for the purposes of the section. 
28 New section 142B defines ‘core activity’ for the purpose of FSMA. Subsection (2) provides that the regulated activity of 
accepting deposits is to be a core activity, but also gives the Treasury power to provide for exceptions to this, by making an 
order setting out circumstances in which accepting deposits is not to be treated as a core activity. The Treasury therefore have 
power to provide (for example) that accepting deposits of high net-worth individuals, or large corporate entities, is not a core 
activity, so that such deposits may be held in banks which are neither ring-fenced bodies nor exempt under section 142A(2) 
from the obligations that apply to ring-fenced bodies’. See also, Schwarcz (n 10) 5–6, 14–15. 
36 The Act also provides the Treasury with a range of delegated powers: (i) Defines a class of institutions which should not be 
regarded as ‘ring-fenced bodies ‘even if they otherwise meet the definition (section 142A(2)(b)); (ii) Defines circumstances 
in which accepting deposits is not to be regarded as a ‘core activity’ (section 142B(2)); (iii) Defines circumstances in which 
a regulated activity other than accepting deposits is to be regarded as a ‘core activity’ (section 142B(5)); (iv) Defines circum- 
stances in which dealing in investments as principal is not to be regarded as an ‘excluded activity’ (section 142D(2)); (v) Add 
any other activity to the definition of ‘excluded activity’ (section 142D(4)); (vi) Impose prohibitions on what a ‘ring-fenced 
body’ can do in relation to specific categories of transaction, establishing branches in specific countries, or holding shares in 
companies of a specified type (section 142E). 
37 See The Act (inserted provisions in the FSMA 2000 as follows: (i) Defines a ‘ring-fenced body’ as one which conducts ‘core 
activities’ (section142A); (ii) Defines the regulated activity of accepting household and SME deposits as a ‘core activity’ 
(section 142B); (iii) Defines the regulated activity of ‘dealing in investments as principal’ as an ‘excluded activity’ (section 
142D); (iv) Establishes that any ‘ring-fended body’ which carries on an ‘excluded activity’ is in breach of its regulatory 
requirements (section 142G). 
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designed to prohibit certain kinds of behaviour or demand some positive actions from a 
financial institution. Non-compliance with these regulations results in serious sanctions. 
Arguably, ‘electrification’ of ring-fencing represents ‘a crucial building block for 
establishing a safer and more secure banking system in the United Kingdom… (which) 
could bring significant benefits for public policy and for banking’.39 The Prudential 
Regulation Authority’s ( PRA) general objective is to promote the safety and 
soundness of the institutions that it regulates.40 The general objective is reflected in the 
Act and it reflects the implicit policy objective 
of curtailing the moral hazard. 
 
B. ‘Electrification’ of the Ring-Fence 
There is a widely held fear that bankers will aim to undermine ring-fencing by getting 
around the new legislation41; this view is based on the theory that private individuals 
will always seek to subvert the workings of regulations to benefit themselves.42 Without 
a clearly defined ring-fence, there is a risk that bankers will be able to pull the wool 
over the eyes of the regulators. For example, the ring-fencing attempts by the National 
Bank Act of 186643 and the Glass-Steagall Act of 193344 were frustrated by the banks 
establishing investment affiliates to get around the prohibition,45 and by intense bank 
lobbying, which paved the way for the repeal of key provisions of the Glass-Steagall 
Act in 1999.46 Even before the repeal, the ring-fence was seriously weakened by the 
interpretation of the legislation through negotiations between the financial institutions 
and the regulators.47 In this type of negotiations, the judgment of regulators often ends 
up losing ground in favour of powerful lobbying and interest groups, and the regulation 
often ends up being ‘captured’.48 This clearly amounts to subversion of justice.49 
 
39 Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, Second Report, HC (2012–13) p 3 and HL Paper 126 of session 1012. 
[Second Report]. 
40 Second Report, paras 29–30. 
41 Mervyn King, before Banking Standards Commission, Financial Times, 22/23 November 2012. 
42 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer, ‘The rise of the Regulatory State’ [2003] Journal of Economic Literature XLI, 401. 
43 The National Bank Act 1864 established the OCC and the federal bank charter; it introduced limitations on bank’s capacity 
to engage in non-banking activities which ring-fenced the banks prior to the US deposit insurance. Before that a number of 
States that had banking charters (e.g. New York) had same type of provisions. 
44 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as the Financial Services Modernisation Act of 1999 [enacted on November 
12 1999] repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The repeal removed barriers in the market among banking, securi- 
ties, and insurance companies that prohibited any one financial institution from acting as any combination of an invest- 
ment bank, a commercial bank and an insurance company. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act enabled commercial banks, investment 
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies to consolidate under one roof. 
45 To get around the ring-fence most banks created affiliates. For example, National City Bank in 1911 and Chase National Bank in 1917, 
both established affiliates that wereable to transact securities business through their ‘parent’ banks prohibited from. National City Bank 
being a New York state charted bank and Chase National Bank being a National Bank were subject to the National Bank Act. 
46 See generally, JG Benston, ‘Is Government Regulation of Banks Necessary?’[2000] Journal of Financial Services Research 
18(2/3), 186. 
47 For example, The Glass-Steagall Act was chipped away by a series of administrative developments and rulings which allowed 
commercial banks to indulge in investment activities, see F Tregenna, ‘The Fat Years: The Structure and Profitability of the 
US Banking Sector in the Pre-Crisis Period’ Cambridge Journal of Economics 33(4), 609–632. 
48 See ‘capture’ or ‘special interest’ theories of regulation: G Stigler, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ [1971] Bell Journal of 
Economics, 3–21; S Peltzman, ‘Toward a More General Theory of Regulation’ [1976] The Journal of Law Economics 19(2), 
211; F McChesney, ‘Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation’ [1987] Journal of Legal 
Studies 16(1), 101. These authors question the motives and capabilities of the regulators. 
49 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’ Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association 








































































































To deal with the concerns of regulation being captured or frustrated in any way, 
the threat of ‘electrification’ was introduced in the Act.50 This could be a powerful tool 
in the regulator’s kit to ensure the independence and integrity of a ring-fenced bank. 
However, this will allow different banking models to operate alongside each other; and, 
it does not explain how this would enhance the performance of the institution itself. 
The PRA and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) are vested with restructuring 
powers; they can require banking groups to restructure their operations where they 
find that a ring-fence is proving to be ineffective. There are four circumstances in 
which group restructuring powers become exercisable.51 These measures were 
thought to be appropriate in the public interest.52 
However, the exercise of the above powers by the PRA and FCA has an inherent 
potential to cause groups to split their commercial (retail) and investment banking 
operations into separate corporate groups. Such a separation is effected by the steps 
that the ring-fenced body may be required to take.53 FSMA 2000, section 142L, also 
affords for the situation where the PRA or FCA needs to impose a requirement on an 
entity for which it is not the appropriate regulator.54 
This plainly punishes an institution which may otherwise be structurally sound; the 
deconstruction of an institution carries disastrous consequences. This kind of extreme 
‘boil them in oil’ approach to enforcement of regulation entailing high penalties55 is 
 
50 See FSMA 2000, section 142. 
51 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, section 142K Cases in which group restructuring powers become exercisable 
‘(1) The appropriate regulator may exercise the group restructuring powers only if it is satisfied that one or more of 
Conditions A to D is met in relation to a ring-fenced body that is a member of a group. (2) Condition A is that the carrying on 
of core activities by the ring-fenced body is being adversely affected by the acts or omissions of other members of its group. 
(3) Condition B is that in carrying on its business the ring-fenced body—(a) is unable to take decisions independently of 
other members of its group, or(b) depends on resources which are provided by a member of its group and which would cease 
to be available in the event of the insolvency of the other member.(4) Condition C is that in the event of the insolvency of 
one or more other members of its group the ring-fenced body would be unable to continue to carry on the core activities 
carried on by it. (5) Condition D is that the ring-fenced body or another member of its group has engaged, or is engaged, 
in conduct which is having, or would apart from this section be likely to have, an adverse effect on the advancement by the 
appropriate regulator—(a) in the case of the PRA, of the objective in section 2B(3)(c), or(b) in the case of the FCA, of the 
continuity objective.’ 
52 See generally B Morgan and K Yeung (n 4), 17–36; C Sunstein, ‘ After the rights revolution: reconceiving the regulatory 
state (Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press 1990); T Prosser, Nationalised Industry and Public Control: Legal, 
Constitutional and Public Issues (Oxford: Blackwell 1986); S Croley, ‘Theories of regulation: Incorporating the administra- 
tive process’ [1998] 98 Columbia Law Review 1, 56–65. 
53 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, section 142L (5) and (6): (5) The steps that the ring-fenced body may be 
required to take are—(a) to dispose of specified property or rights to an outside person; (b) to apply to the court under Part 7 for 
an order sanctioning a ring-fencing transfer scheme relating to the transfer of the whole or part of the business of the ring-fenced 
body to an outside person; (c) otherwise to make arrangements discharging the ring-fenced body from specified liabilities. (6) 
The steps that another authorised person or a qualifying parent undertaking may be required to take are—(a) to dispose of any 
shares in, or securities of, the ring-fenced body to an outside person; (b) to dispose of any interest in any other body corporate that 
is member of the ring-fenced body’s group to an outside person; (c) to dispose of other specified property or rights to an outside 
person; (d) to apply to the court under Part 7 for an order sanctioning a ring-fencing transfer scheme relating to the transfer of the 
whole or part of the business of the authorized person or qualifying parent undertaking to an outside person. 
54 See Financial Services (Banking Reform) ACT 2013, Explanatory Notes, no.45, furthermore: ‘The PRA is given power to 
require the FCA to impose the relevant requirement. The FCA is given an equivalent power where it is the appropriate regula- 
tor, and it wishes to impose a requirement on a PRA-authorised person. The powers set out in this section include a power to 
require a ring-fenced body to make arrangements discharging it from liabilities specified by the regulator (subsection (5)(c)). 
In some cases the regulator may be able to impose the same requirements on authorised persons under sections 55L or 55M. 
Subsection (8) makes it clear that this does not affect the regulator’s use of the group restructuring powers set out in this section.’ 
55 G Becker, ‘Crime and punishment: An Economic Approach’ [1968] Journal of Political Economy 76(2), 169–217. 
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rarely workable because there will be a stronger desire for ‘capture’ and subversion of 
justice.56 
Besides, the fundamental fault with this reasoning is that it wholly relies on regula- 
tion and shuts the door on criminal and tort law taking effect against the individuals 
who cause the breach of the ring-fence and harm the banking institution;57 the prin- 
ciples of strict liability, negligence, and fraud can also play important roles.58 A mix of 
regulation and litigation is needed in the sector.59 Regulation organizing private litiga- 
tion can be beneficial for financial market development, for example, rules that lower 
the cost of litigation and facilitate litigation. 
The largest banks face the constant threat of being split up if they undermine the 
purpose of the ring-fence and present a risk to the financial system. The threat of being 
broken up is likely to cause regulatory uncertainty and uncertainty for investors and 
make it harder for those banks to raise money, which could then be loaned to businesses. 
The wider theoretical and practical implications are that this element of uncer- 
tainty could contribute to a market failure in a devastating way.60 For example, if a 
bank is under scrutiny in the context of electrification, news of it being broken up 
could spread panic in the market place among the investors and shareholders, which 
could ultimately cause a run on the bank. So the electrification scrutiny could easily 
itself cause a market failure; any view contradicting this argument is not based on 
any empirical views—they simply amount to personal views and lack  theoretical 
depth.61 
Also, there is actually a public policy issue here which militates against the ‘elec- 
trification’ power provisions in the Act and deserves attention. The construct of 
the ‘electrification’ powers in the Act allows public policy to be changed by the 
regulators. The fact that, effectively, the electrification provisions would allow the 
regulator to introduce a full separation of retail and investment banking within the 
groups actually amounts to modifying public policy without recourse to parlia- 
ment, and it seems to be unreasonable. Although Parliament can confer legislative 
 
56 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer (n 49), 403. 
57 Ibid (n 49), 404–408; L Friedman, A History of American Law, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1985; RA Posner, ‘A Theory of 
Negligence’ [1972] The Journal of Legal Studies 1(1) , 29–96. 
58 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer (n 49), 401–404. 
59 M Arnold, ‘Prosecuting bankers would be a start’, Financial Times, August 4, 2014; J Rakoff (a US district judge): ‘I suggest 
that the future deterrent value of successfully prosecuting individuals far outweighs the prophylactic benefits of imposing 
internal compliance measures that are often little more than window-dressing’ 
60 See generally FM Bator, ‘The Anatomy of Market Failure’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 72, 351–79351; R Cooter, 
‘Normative Failures Theory of Law’ [1996] Cornell Law Review 82, 947, 949; RO Zerbe Jr and HE McCurdy, ‘The Failure 
of Market Failure’ [1999] Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 558, 559. 
61 See, for example, the oral evidence of Antonio Horta-Osório, Group Chief Executive, Lloyds Banking Group, taken before 
the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (Question no. 3421, HC 606-xxx1). He disagreed with the BBA’s 
opposition to electrification. He said: 
‘We were not notified about those comments, which I think were made by the CEO of the BBA in his name. I support electri- 
fication, like I supported ring-fencing. As you know, we were the only bank publicly to support ring-fencing. The reason why 
I support your proposal is that, if we think that for society as a whole it is better to have ring-fencing, both from a financial 
stability point of view and from a cultural point of view, I absolutely agree that you should have strong enforcement and 
strong incentives in order for that to happen’, Second Report, para 15; See also both Sir David Walker, Chairman of Barclays 
and Douglas Flint, Executive Chairman of HSBC, also supported the proposal for the first reserve power, the latter saying: 
‘In the event that it is judged that participants are circumventing or frustrating the purpose of the ring-fence, it seems to me 






































































































powers on the regulator, it is uncharacteristic that in this case the regulator would 
actually be exercising parliamentary powers, because it is parliament only which 
can make and change public policy. Thus, the provisions on electrification are 
anomalous. 
In this public policy debate, the central question is why ring-fencing (par- 
tial structural separation) was preferable over total separation in the first place? 
Maybe it is designed to enable a non-ring-fenced investment entity in a banking 
group to inject money into a ring-fenced retail institution that got into trouble. 
There must be many other benefits that were envisaged in the choice of partial 
structural separation because it is inconceivable that the preference of partial sep- 
aration happened to come about at the centre stage without any other reasons for 
such public policy.62 If partial structural separation is removed and replaced with 
full structural separation, what happens to the thinking behind the partial struc- 
tural separation on which the whole structure of public policy was built upon? 
The whole logic of it stands on its head and it remains an unexplained. Besides, 
what is the point of full structural separation? The idea that full separation of 
retail and investment banking would make the financial system safe was unreal- 
istic. This over-interprets the benefits of full separation, and the economy could 
still be blown up by failures of investment banks or the shadow banking sector.63 
The benefits of public policy advocating full separation are neither fully analysed 
nor understood. 
Furthermore, the kind of behaviour that will invite the enforcement of electri- 
fication provisions of the Act against a bank could not be regarded as ‘institutional 
behaviour’; rather, it must be an individual behaviour of the employees. First, it 
is illogical to ‘punish’ the institution for the wrongdoings of a few individuals and 
bring about further structural change; there is no theoretical justification for such 
a reaction. Furthermore no studies have been carried out to inform us or enable 
us to comprehend what the consequences of such a change across the national 
economy would be for wider society and global relationships. To deal with indi- 
vidual behaviour, it may be argued that the specific behavioural regulation should 
suffice, along with the existing common law and company law.64 The electrifica- 
tion provisions are equivalent to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. Second, 
structural changes should only be brought about for institutional reasons and not 
otherwise. Thirdly, institutional restructuring must be a public policy issue, with 
the public policy brought about by parliament in the form of legislation; it is not 
something that could or should be changed or implemented by regulators. It may 
be a perfect argument that parliament could delegate regulatory powers to a regu- 
lator; however, these ‘electrification’ powers have gone too far, putting a regulator 




62 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer, (n 49), the authors explain in their ‘theory of law enforcement,’ the reasons for choosing a particu- 
lar type of regulatory regime. 
63 P Tucker, ‘Regulatory Reform, Stability and Central Banking’, Brookings Institution Working Paper, 2014. 
64 G Mitchell, ‘Sanctions for Bank Directors and Ring-Fencing’ [2013] Butterworth’s Journal of International Banking and 
Financial Law, 287–289. 
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The proposal that there should be an automatic periodic review of the ring-fence 
legislation every 2/3/4 etc. years to make sure that the bankers are not undermining 
the fence would help create a formidable regulatory system instead of merely relying 
on the regulators, which are susceptible to ‘capture’ by special interest groups at a 
serious cost to the rest of society. Automatic revision of this legislation, although a 
rare phenomenon, will be justifiable on the basis of public interest, as financial reg- 
ulation, like the financial industry itself, is a special case. This will also reduce the 
dependence on and concentration of too much power within the hands of regulators, 
and would avoid the risk of capture. Such a two-tier system would guarantee the sta- 
bility of the financial system. 
 
(C) Regulatory Rationale for the Ring-Fence and the ‘Electrification’ in the Act 
The Banking Reforms Act emerged as a regulatory response to financial market fail- 
ures65 as a consequence of the 2007–08 financial crisis in the United Kingdom and 
across the world. The theoretical reasons for this Act are rooted in public interest66 
and emerged as a regulatory command and control strategy67 for the financial sector to 
ensure its stability. The fundamental nature of command and control is that it displays 
its influence by imposing standards backed by sanctions.68 
The command and control strategy is largely exercised by the FCA and PRA. The 
Act provides the regulators with rule-making powers, which allow them to bring in an 
even more extensive regime of command and control. The legislation would use force 
of law to impose inflexible benchmarks.69 Politically, this kind of thinking seems astute 
because the government and the regulators are seen here to be acting forcefully and 
taking a clear stand in the aftermath of the financial crisis, by describing some forms of 
institutional behaviour as unacceptable. The public is being assured that the full force 
of the law would be used to protect their interests and in the interest of the financial 
system. 
However, the command and control strategy can only be justified if the critics are 
unable to argue for a better alternative strategy.70 There are significant inherent prob- 
lems71 associated with the command and control strategy, such as ‘capture’72 and ‘legal- 
ism’,73 which the regulation ensuing the Act might face. Strikingly, the Act ignores other 
enforcement strategies such as those based on economic incentives.74. Expanded incen- 
tives for whistle-blowers to report suspected violation of a ring-fence could prove a 
better alternative to the electrification idea. 
 
65 See generally FM Bator, ‘The Anatomy of Market Failure’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 72, 351–79; R Baldwin and M Cave 
(n 4) 9–16. 
66 M Feintuck, ‘Regulatory Rationales Beyond the Economic: In Search of the Public Interest’, in R Baldwin, M Cave and M 
Lodge (n 4) 39–60. 
67 R Baldwin, C Cave; B Morgan, K Yeung (n 4). 
68 R Baldwin, ‘Regulation: After Command and Control’, in K. Hawkins (ed.), The Human Face of Law (OUP 1997). 
69 B Morgan, K Yeung, See generally the ‘the role of law’ in regulation discussed by the authors, 17–74. 
70 Ibid. 
71 See generally, RB Stewart, ‘Regulation on the Crisis of Legalism in the United State’, in T Daintith (ed.), Law as an Investment 
of Economic Policy, Berlin, 1998; E Bardach and R Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness 
Philadelphia, 1982; N Gunningham and P Grabosky, Smart Regulation (OUP 1998), 44–45. 
72 R Baldwin, M Cave (n 4), 36–37. 
73 Ibid 37–38. 
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3. . A N A LTER N ATIVE TO ELECTR IFIC ATION: E X PA NDED  
INCEN TIVE S FOR WHIS TLE - BLOWER S TO R EPORT SUS PECTED 
R ING - FENCE VIOL ATION  
Arguably there are some common law alternatives along with or without regulation75; 
the ‘whistle-blower’ concept can prove to be a better, simpler, more efficient,76 and 
effective alternative to ‘electrification’ of ring-fencing. Whistle-blowing is a term of art; 
it has special meaning in the legal context, as it does in other disciplines; it is a multi- 
disciplinary concept. Hence, it cannot be defined in a normative sense, including all of 
its multidisciplinary characteristics and virtues. In this sense, it is a multi-disciplinary 
and functional concept, which can be defined as a process, and to that end includes at 
least four elements77: the whistle-blower, the act of whistle-blowing, the recipient of the 
complaint, and the target organization of the complaint. The act of whistle-blowing on 
an organization is an act of resistance78 and represents the ‘voice’ of dissidence.79 The 
act of whistle-blowing has been variously interpreted as providing information about 
the organizational activities that ‘harm third parties’80 or ‘jeopardize the public inter- 
est’.81 The concerned activity may involve ‘misconduct, neglect, or irresponsibility’,82 
‘corrupt, socially harmful, or illegal activity’,83 or ‘wasteful activities’.84 
The four elements of whistle-blowing on which most authors agree are as follows85: 
First, the whistle-blower is or has been a member of the organization86; second, the whis- 
tle-blower is an individual who lacks legitimate authority to change the organization’s 
activities87; third, the whistle-blower can sometimes remain anonymous, although this 
is not without ethical and practical implications88; and fourth, the whistle-blower may 
 
75 For example, Litigation for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, doctrine of ultra vires and tort litigation for strict 
liability and negligence, see AG Mitchell, ‘Sanctions for Bank Directors and Ring Fencing’ [2013] Butterworth’s Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law, 288. 
76 EL Glaeser and A Shleifer (n 49) 201–204; G Mitchell (99), 287–289. 
77 JP Near and MP Miceli, Organisational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing, Journal of Business Ethics 4, 1985, 2; cf. 
see PB Jubb, Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation, Journal of Business Ethics 21: 83 (1999) the author 
mentions six elements of the proposed definition of whistle-blowing; see also JP Near and MP Miceli, ‘Whistle-Blowing: 
Myth and Reality’ [1996] Journal of Management 22(3), 506, The authors accept three elements of whistle-blowing process. 
78 FA Elliston, ‘Civil Disobedience and Whistle-Blowing: a Comparative Appraisal of Two Forms of Dissident’   [1982b] 
Journal of Business Ethics 1, 23–28. 
79 AO Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 1970). 
80 FA Elliston (78) 23–28. 
81 D Farrell and JC Petersen, ‘Patterns of Political Behaviour in Organisations’ [1982] Academy of Management Review 7, 
403–412. 
82 D Farrell and JC Petersen, Ibid. 
83 IL Janis and L Mann, Decision Making (New York: Free Press 1977). 
84 United States Merit Systems Protection Board (USMSPB), Whistle-blowing and the federal employee, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1981. 
85 JP Near and MP. Miceli, ‘Organisational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-Blowing’ [1985] The Journal of Business Ethics 
4(1), 1–16. 
86 D Farrell and JC Petersen (n 81) 403–412; IL Janis and L Mann (n 83); United States Merit Systems Protection  Board 
(USMSPB), Whistle-blowing and the federal employee, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1981. 
87 FA Elliston ‘Anonymity and Whistle-Blowing’ [1982a] Journal of Business Ethics 1, 167–177; D Weinstein, Bureaucratic 
Opposition (New York: Pergamon Press 1979). 
88 FA Elliston (n 78). 
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occupy a role such as an auditor, ombudsman, or any other overseeing role where he/she 
may be officially required to blow the whistle if he/she observes organizational wrongdo- 
ing.89 From these four attributes, it may be broadly concluded that the whistle-blower is 
a person, normally an insider, who provides information regarding regulatory violation.90 
There is disagreement among authors as to the third element—the nature of the 
person or agency who receives information—in the whistle-blowing process. Some 
authors identify the appropriate recipient of information in the whistle-blowing process 
as an external person or agency to the organization.91 This amounts to a public com- 
plaint; in their view, internal complaint does not truly represent the whistle-blowing 
process.92 However, some authors value internal or external complaint equally, as long 
as the internal complaint is also made to someone other than the immediate superior.93 
Any organization, public or private, may be made a target of whistle-blowing. By 
encouraging whistle-blowing, the organizations will gain additional information that 
may be used to enhance their operational capabilities.94 To this end, whistle-blowing 
may be broadly defined as disclosure by the members of an organization of illegal and 
unethical actions by the employers to a person or agency, internal or external which 
can bring about action against the perpetrators of such illegal and unethical activities.95 
In the context of the financial sector, the whistle-blower concept has two important 
aspects. First is that a whistle-blower should be rewarded with a substantial bounty for 
providing useful information to the regulators regarding regulatory violations; secondly, 
he/she should be provided with retaliation protection.96 In the United Kingdom, whis- 
tle-blowing regulation is still in its infancy. The whistle-blowing interest group Public 
Concern at Work (PCaW) set up an independent commission in 2013 to review all 
aspects of whistle-blowing, including legal, governance, and best practice arrangements. 
In November 2014, it published its report, which made a number of recommendations. 
The commission, however, did not make any recommendation for the introduction of 
financial rewards or incentives for whistle-blowing. The commission’s recommendations 
are not specific to any particular sector; rather, they are more general in nature. 
In the United States, the concept was introduced more robustly in the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),97 although it was 
 
89 JP Near and MP Miceli, ‘Organisational Dissidence’ (n 85). 
90 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) defines a whistle-blower as an individual or group of individuals ‘ who 
provide… information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or 
regulation, by the Commission.’ See also section 21 F, ‘Securities Whistle-blower Incentives and Protection’, Dodd-Frank Act 
s 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841–1842. 
91 R Nader, PJ Petkas and K Blackwell (eds.), Whistle-blowing: The report on the conference on professional responsibility, 
Grossman, New York, 1972; D Weinstein (n 87). 
92 D Farrell and JC Petersen (n 81), 403–412; IL Janis and L Mann (n 83). 
93 FA Elliston (n 87), 167–177; AO Hirschman (n 83). 
94 See generally DW Ewing, Do It My Way-Or You’re Fired! (New York: John Wiley & Sons 1983). 
95 JP Near and MP. Miceli, ‘Organisational Dissidence’ (n 77), 4. 
96 This concept was introduced in SOX 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of the US 
Code); Also in an enhanced form in Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, S 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841–49 (2010) (codi- 
fied at 15 U.S.C. S 78u-6); See R G Vaughn, ‘America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistle-blowers’ 
[2005] Administrative Law Review 57, 1, 4. 
97 Pub. L.NO.111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the US Code). Dodd-Frank Act is a vast and 
sweeping overhaul of the US financial and regulatory system, was signed into law on 21 July 2010 by President Barack 






































































































introduced 8 years earlier in Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200298 (SOX) in a weaker form. 
section 299 of Dodd-Frank expands the incentives for a whistle-blower99 by obliging 
The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), by adding a new provision, to ‘pay an 
award’ to whistle-blowers ‘who voluntarily provide original information to the com- 
mission that led to the successful enforcement of the …action’.100 Furthermore, in 
protecting whistle-blowers, new section 21 F(h)(1)(A) forbids employers from dis- 
charging, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, or in any other way discrimi- 
nating against a whistle-blower ‘because of any lawful act done by the whistle-blower 
in (i) providing information to the SEC, (ii) helping in any SEC investigation or action 
related to such information, or (iii) ‘in making disclosures that are required or protected 
under’ any securities law, rule, or regulation’.101 The enforcement of this prohibition was 
further fortified in new section 21 F(h)(1)(B) that creates a private right of action for 
individuals alleging a violation of the anti-retaliation provisions.102 This enables whis- 
tle-blowers to file a complaint in a district court without first having to exhaust admin- 
istrative options.103 
Recently, a sudden increase was revealed in whistle-blowing reports sent to FCA 
following a Freedom of Information request made to the regulator.104 FCA figures show 
that the regulator launched 254 new cases on the basis of whistle-blowers’ informa- 
tion in 2012/13 compared with only 148 cases a year earlier; this is an increase of 72 
per cent. The concern of the whistle-blower in the suspected market manipulation is 
encouraging. It is easily discernable from this pattern that further encouragement to 
would-be informers, on the basis of reward, would be a successful regulatory strategy. 
Whistle-blowing provisions in the Banking Reform Act would have provided a bet- 
ter solution for the financial market failure and for the improvement of the stability 
of the financial system. A similar provision, as in US legislation, in respect of protec- 
tion against retaliation in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act would have 
proved to be the most influential and effective tool for the protection of the ring-fence. 
Furthermore, an even better regulation in this respect would be where retaliation pro- 
tection is available to both those who report information externally to the regulators 
as well as those who report internally to the company (bank) itself. This glaring defi- 
ciency exists in the Dodd-Frank Act, with section 922 retaliation protection only apply- 
ing to those whistle-blowers who report information externally (to SEC), leaving those 
informers who report internally (to the company) either without protection or only 
protected by the weaker protection of SOX. 
 
 
98 Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat.745 (codified in scattered sections of the US Code). 
99 See B Carton, Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd-Frank Bounty Provision, COMPLIANCE WEEK, September 2010, 1–2.; R Levick, 
A Whole New Ballgame: Dodd-Frank’s Whistle-blower Provisions, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2010, 1;53 PM); RG Vaughn, 
‘America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistle-blowers’ [2005] Administrative Law Review 57, 1, 4. 
100         Dodd-Frank Act S 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841–1842. 
101          Ibid 1845–1846. 
102          Ibid 1846. 
103 Dodd-Frank improves regulatory regime regarding ‘whistleblowing’ in a number of way, for example, aggrieved employee 
has more time to file complaint, bring a claim up to 6 years after the has occurred or up to 3 years after becoming aware of 
the claim (provided the claim is brought within 10 years of the violation) (Dodd-Frank Act s 922 (a), 124 Stat. at 1846. In 
contrast SOX requires a complaint to be filed within 180 days of the violation or becoming aware of it (18 USC. S 1514A (b) 
(2)(D) amended by Dodd-Frank Act s 922 (c)(1)(A)(I), 124 Stat. at 1848. 
104         Financial Times, 23 December 2013. 
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Notwithstanding the benefits of external reporting (Dodd-Frank rule), there are 
serious reservations about the regulatory success as far as achieving the aims of the 
regulation. The business and legal communities in the United States, as well as the SEC, 
have acknowledged the potential for the substantial rewards required by the Act to 
undermine internal compliance procedures (e.g. by SOX) by causing a race to the SEC 
for external reporting.105 The reward and the two-tier nature of the retaliation protec- 
tion, that is, external and internal, both autonomously incentivize external reporting. 
Under Dodd-Frank, a whistle-blower worried about retaliation has an advantage and 
incentive to report directly to SEC as well as internally at the same time, creating a max- 
imum level of protection against retaliation. Any attempt on new legislation regarding 
‘whistle-blower provision’ incentivizing whistle-blowers to report regulatory violations 
must take into account this flaw in the design of Dodd-Frank and should address both 
provisions embedded in SOX and Dodd-Frank. 
SOX encourages internal reporting anonymously for corporate wrongdoings 
through internal disclosure systems and incorporates anti-retaliation provisions for 
the protection of the whistle-blowers106. Section 806 of SOX protects whistle-blowers 
against external reporting to federal regulators, law enforcement agencies, and com- 
mittees of congress or its members.107 However, it is a far weaker response to deal with 
the problem effectively, because it only protects those whistle-blowers who provide 
the information with a ‘reasonable belief ’ that the violation actually occurred. In con- 
trast, the Dodd-Frank offers much more robust protection to the whistle-blower by not 
limiting its protection to a ‘reasonable belief ’ that the violation actually occurred108. 
However, a serious problem remains in that it extends its protection only to those whis- 
tle-blowers who report externally. 
Comparatively stronger and more robust protection for a whistle-blower against 
retaliation if he/she reports the suspected regulatory violations directly to the regulators 
rather than to the company (bank) would discourage internal reporting, thus weakening 
institutions’ internal compliance and reporting procedures and systems. Equally strong 
and robust external (to regulators) and internal (to bank) reporting of regulatory viola- 
tions will play an important role in the early detection and prevention of fraud and other 
regulatory violations. In this context, it is also important that the term ‘whistle-blower’ 
or any other equivalent term is defined broadly to achieve maximum impact,109 that is, 
should protection only apply to ‘whistle-blowers’ or it should include other reporting 
sources as well. For example, the term ‘whistle-blower’ is defined narrowly by the SEC.110 
 
105 See Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistle-blower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488 (proposed Nov.17, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249); A letter from the Association of 
Corporate Counsel to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary of Section 1–2 (15 December 2010), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-126.pdf; A letter from Bus. Roundtable to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary of Secion 2 
(17 December 2010) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-142.pdf. 
106 See 15 U.S.C S 78 j-1(m) (4) (B) (2006); See also RM Moberly, ‘Unfulfilled expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why 
Sabanes-Oxxley Whistle-blowers Rarely Win’ [2007] William and Mary Law Review 49(1), 65, 75. 
107 18 U.S.C s 1341, 1343–1344, 1348. 
108 18 U.S.C S 1514 A (a) (1). 
109 The prohibition on retaliation found in new section 21 F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act applies only to ‘whistle-blower’, the 
term is defined narrowly in new section 21F(a)(6) at 1842; it includes only those who provide ‘ information relating to a 
violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission’. 






































































































The system of retaliation protection for a whistle-blower who is reporting inter- 
nally (to company) actually and effectively creates an internal monitoring system.111 
Any lack of retaliation protection to a whistle-blower who is reporting internally would 
unfortunately work against the goal of the regulation that is designed in respect of the 
whistle-blowing. To the same extent, Dworkin and Callahan have argued, ‘[i]f… the 
primary goal of whistle-blowing is reduction of wrongdoing rather than prosecution 
of wrongdoers, and the speed with which problems are addressed is significant, then 
internal whistleblowing should be preferred’ to external whistle-blowing.112 It is fur- 
ther argued that ‘when the internal/external question is posed in the context of social- 
psychological research generally, and especially when approached from the perspective 
of organizational needs and behaviour, there is little doubt that internal whistle-blow- 
ing is preferable to external reporting’.113 This view has been endorsed by the major- 
ity of researchers ‘as the most effective response to organizational wrongdoing’114; the 
research has displayed that the most efficient way of combating occupational fraud is 
a company’s internal system of anonymous reporting.115 The SEC also agrees with this 
view that ‘internal compliance and reporting system are essential sources of information 
for companies about misconduct’… if these programmes are not utilized or working, 
our system of securities regulation will be less effective.116 Therefore, both Dodd-Frank 
and SOX need to be amended to provide equivalent protection for potential whistle- 
blowers, regardless of whether they choose to report externally or internally; and the 
Banking Reforms Act should have followed this approach. 
Thus, to ensure that the bankers do not breach the ring-fence, it is important to have 
a robust and effective whistle-blowing system that protects potential whistle-blowers from 
retaliation and rewards them generously regardless of whether they choose to report inter- 
nally or externally. This is a lesson that can be learnt from the dichotomy of Dodd-Frank and 
SOX. Whistle-blower provision could be the single most important regulation for the pro- 
tection of investors, financial institutions, and the stability of the financial system as a whole. 
Whistle-blowing is a preventive measure, whereas ‘electrification’ is punitive in 
nature—there is no point in dealing with the issue long after the damage has been done 
to the financial system; in such situations, the financial system could even be beyond 
repair before ‘electrification’ comes into play. It is far better to prevent the damage hap- 
pening in the first place. The whistle-blower solution is also cost-effective. 
 
4. .  CONCLUS ION  
The PCBS made an argument during the Bill stage that the ‘ring-fence’ regulation, 
based on Sir John Vickers’ report, fell short of expectations, and that it would be easily 
 
111 See O Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties within Twenty-First-Century New Governance’ [2009] 
Forbham Law Review 77, 1245, 1251. 
112 TM Dworkin and ES Callahan ‘Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organisation and 
Society’ [1991] American Business Law Journal 29, 267, 306. 
113 Ibid p. 299. 
114    Ibid p. 299, N.167. See also, K Rubinstein, ‘Internal whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: Balancing the Interests 
of Employee and Employer’ [2007–2008] New York Law School Law Review 52, 637, 650; TM Dworkin, and JP Near, 
‘Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?’ [1987] American Business Law Journal 241, 242–243. 
115 See Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2008 Report to the nation on occupation fraud & Abuse 18 (2008). 
116 Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistle-blower provisions of section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act 1934, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 70,496. 
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breached by unscrupulous bankers. To deal with the regulation being captured or frus- 
trated in any way, it recommended the threat of ‘electrification’ in the Bill in the form 
of two distinct powers for the regulators, namely the first reserve power and the second 
reserve power. The first power would enable the regulator to take steps that could lead 
to full separation of retail and investment activities within a group. The first reserve 
power made it into the Act, whereas the second power was rejected. 
However, the fact remains that the regulator would be allowed to change legisla- 
tion. It is unreasonable that in this case the regulator would be exercising parliamentary 
powers, because it is parliament alone that can make and change public policy, even if 
parliament were to confer legislative powers on the regulator. 
A better view in this context would be that there should be an automatic periodic 
review of the ring-fence legislation. This would help to create a formidable regulatory 
system instead of merely relying on the regulator, which would always be susceptible 
to ‘capture’ by special interest groups at a serious cost to the rest of the society. Periodic 
revision of this legislation, although a rare phenomenon, is justifiable on the basis of 
public interest and the fact that financial regulation, like the financial sector itself, is a 
special case; regardless, avoidance of market failures and the stability of the financial 
system and consequently the stability of the entire economy should be the focus. 
Furthermore, to ensure that bankers do not breach the ring-fence, it is also impor- 
tant to have a robust and effective whistle-blowing system and economic incentives in 
place, which protect the potential whistle-blowers from retaliation and reward them 
generously, regardless of whether they choose to report internally or externally, as also 
found in section 922 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act). This is a lesson that can be learnt from the dichotomy of Dodd- 
Frank and SOX. The whistle-blower provision could be the single most important 
regulation for the protection of investors, financial institutions, and the stability of the 
financial system as a whole. Whistle-blowing is a cost-effective and preventive meas- 
ure, which, if included in such regulation, would certainly enhance the stability of the 
financial system. 
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